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ABSTRACT
The normative literature on decentralization of public goods provision   has many testable empirical
implications. This paper explores some of these implications by looking at the relationship between
decentralization and an environmental public good, water quality in rivers at monitoring stations around
the world. It examines pollution levels and interjurisdictional variation in these levels for both a local
and a regional pollutant.  When fixed effects are included, greater decentralization is associated with
higher levels of the regional pollutant only, suggesting interjurisdictional free riding. Federal countries
exhibit greater interjurisdictional variation in both pollutants, consistent with the traditional view that
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sigman@econ.rutgers.eduMany countries are actively considering the appropriate level of government to conduct en-
vironmental policy. In the U.S., recent Supreme Court decisions limit the federal government’s
authority to undertake environmental regulation (Barringer, 2006). In the European Union, the
trend has been the reverse, with increased reliance on common or harmonized environmental poli-
cies. An extensive literature discusses the desirability of decentralization in provision of public
goods and, speciﬁcally, environmental quality.
Several arguments in the decentralization debate would lead to an effect of decentralization on
the level of environmental quality (or pollution) and on interjurisdictional variation in this qual-
ity. The traditional model of Oates (1972) suggests an increase in interjurisdictional variation,
although it does not have a clear implication for typical environmental quality. Destructive reg-
ulatory competition, in the form of a “race to the bottom,” would lower environmental quality
with decentralization, but probably not increase variation across regions. Interjurisdictional free
riding might give rise to higher levels of transboundary pollutants with greater decentralization,
but not higher levels of more local pollutants. Distributive politics within the central government
may cause the national government to overprovide public goods (Besley and Coate, 2003; Lock-
wood, 2002). Finally, central governments may be either more or less susceptible to industrial
interest groups than subnational governments (Bardan and Mookherjee, 2000; Esty, 1996; Revesz,
2001). Thus, the net effects of decentralization remain uncertain and provide an opportunity to
differentiate empirically among the normative arguments.
Effects of decentralization on environmental policy and outcomes have begun to be docu-
mented in the empirical literature (discussed at greater length below). Papers by List and Gerking
(2000) and Millimet (2003) are most similar to the current paper because they look at the net ef-
fect of changes over time in decentralization on policy outcomes; they ﬁnd limited effects of the
U.S. Reagan-era decentralization on air pollution and pollution abatement spending.1 Unlike ear-
1List and Gerking (2000) conclude that neither spending nor air pollution (nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emis-
sions) changed after 1980, whereas Millimet (2003) ﬁnds that spending (but not air pollution) rose by the mid-1980s.
Both papers discuss their results in terms of destructive competition, but their results might be interpreted in terms of
the broader set of hypotheses discussed here. Similarly, Oates (2002) points to the many cases in which U.S. states
do not use discretion to lower environmental standards. A more extreme example is the current state-level drive to
address global climate change.
1lier work, this paper incorporates international experience with decentralization and examines the
differences between local and regional pollutants. This paper also may be the ﬁrst in the environ-
mental or public economics literature to examine interjurisdictional variation in the level of the
public good provided as a test of the Decentralization Theorem.2
This study focuses on water pollution in rivers around the world, using data from the UN’s
Global Environment Monitoring System Water Quality Monitoring Programme (GEMS/Water).
The pollutants studied are biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), which is transported far down-
stream, and fecal coliform, which has local effects and is thus less of a candidate for interjurisdic-
tional free riding. The estimated equations model pollution levels and interjurisdictional variation
in pollution as depending on a country’s decentralization, other country characteristics, and char-
acteristics of the monitoring location. Panel data analyses are conducted because both the pollution
and some decentralization measures vary over time within countries.
The results suggest higher interjurisdictional variation in pollution levels in federal countries
for both pollutants. Such variation supports the traditional view of Oates (1972) that decentral-
ization allows better tailoring of policies to local conditions. The results for pollution levels are
more ambiguous, which is perhaps consistent with the profusion of hypotheses. When ﬁxed effects
are included, the regional pollutant, BOD, increases with decentralization. This positive associ-
ation could result from interjurisdictional free riding in such regional pollutants. Although some
estimates also suggest higher local pollution with decentralization, the coefﬁcient estimates are
unstable. Thus, the evidence is weaker for more general problems from decentralization, such
as destructive regulatory competition or greater sensitivity of local governments to interest group
politics.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines hypotheses about the asso-
ciation between decentralization and environmental quality. Section 2 describes the GEMS data
and variables matched from other sources. Section 3 presents the estimates of equations for the
2In a similar spirit, Faguet (2004) ﬁnds that a decentralization in Bolivia resulted better “tailoring” of spending, for
example increasing sewerage spending in places where access to sewers is lower. My approach makes no judgments
about who needs better environmental quality, simply looking at heterogeneity for evidence of improved tailoring.
2levels of the two pollutants, with and without monitoring station ﬁxed effects. Section 4 describes
the procedure used to calculate interjurisdictional variation in pollution levels within a country and
looks at the association between this variation and decentralization. A ﬁnal section concludes.
1 Effects of decentralization
An extensive theoretical literature describes conditions under which decentralization in public
goods provision is welfare improving. In this section, I discuss ﬁve hypotheses from this literature
with goal of deriving positive implications about the effect of decentralization on environmental
quality.
First, Oates (1972) posits that central governments ﬁnd it difﬁcult to generate optimal local
variation in policy stringency. The central government may be unable to vary stringency because it
ﬁnds variation costly for political reasons or because it lacks the information about local conditions
to chose regionally-varying optimal responses. This model does not have clear implications for the
typical level of pollution; whether average pollution levels rise or fall with decentralization will
depend on how the central government aggregates preferences (e.g., whether the central legislature
has proportional representation or a plurality voting system such as those in the U.S. and U.K.)
and how this system interacts with the distribution of preferences for environmental quality across
jurisdictions.3
This model does suggest a positive association between decentralization and interjurisdictional
variation in environmental quality. If the central government allows insufﬁcient variation in stan-
dards, decentralization will yield a higher variance in these levels as local governments choose
standards that reﬂect their heterogeneous preferences. Thus, an increase in variation is a likely
outcome and can be tested in practice.4
3For example, suppose voters with greener preferences are concentrated in a few jurisdictions. With decentralized
decision-making, these jurisdictions choose stricter standards than the rest of the country. With centralized decision-
makingandadecisivemedianvoter, thestandardmaybesimilartothemedianofthestandardschosenunderdecentral-
ization. But, it is not difﬁcult to construct examples where a national government elected by the jurisdictions chooses,
for example, a less stringent standard because green voters concentrated in a few jurisdictions are less inﬂuential.
4For a case in which decentralization might reduce variation, suppose preferences for in-stream water quality are
3A second normative hypothesis with positive implications is destructive competition (a “race to
thebottom”or“racetothetop”)betweenjurisdictions. Withoutmarketimperfectionsorredistribu-
tive public policies, welfare-maximizing subnational governments will make efﬁcient choices for
local pollutants (Oates and Schwab, 1988; Wilson, 1996). However, both market failures and re-
distributive policies are common, so destructive competition seems a possibility in practice (Oates,
2002; Kunce and Shogren, 2005). The competition may take the form of a “race to the bottom,” in
which countries lower environmental standards to compete for capital. In other situations, it may
be a “race to the top” or Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome, in which local governments
raise standards to shift environmental damages to other jurisdictions. Empirical evidence supports
the view that environmental competition arises within the U.S. federal system (Levinson, 2003;
Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002).
Interjurisdictional environmental spillovers are a third hypothesis with positive implications.5
Failing to consider the welfare of neighbors, subnational governments may choose higher levels of
pollutants that cross state borders than the national government would choose (Silva and Caplan,
1997). Several studies report empirical evidence of such free riding within the United States (Hel-
land and Whitford, 2003; Sigman, 2005; Gray and Shadbegian, 2004). Lipscomb and Mobarak
(2007) ﬁnd evidence of free riding by counties in Brazil, where the jurisdictional borders shift over
time. Free riding would increase the level of pollution with decentralization for regional pollutants,
such as BOD, but not for local pollutants.
Centralgovernmentdecision-makingcancreateafourthsetofeffects(Lockwood, 2002; Besley
and Coate, 2003). Besley and Coate (2003) conclude that the central government may overpro-
vide local public goods when regional spillovers arise. The overprovision comes from strategic
voting for representatives to the central legislature. Thus, they would predict that pollution would
identical across regions, but consequences of different levels of emissions for in-stream water quality varies (perhaps
because of geography or climate conditions). Since the government usually regulates (or taxes) emissions rather than
in-stream pollution, a local government may exploit an informational advantage to yield an environmental outcome
closer to the optimum than what the national government could achieve with a uniform emission standard. In the em-
pirical work, I look at interjurisdictional variation conditioning on some characteristics of the location, but presumably
not all the conditions that an optimizing local government might consider.
5Interjurisdictional spillovers are also the source of destructive competition. However, I distinguish between
spillovers in costs (destructive competition) and the physical movement of pollutants between jurisdictions.
4rise with decentralization (although, in contrast to the destructive competition and spillover hy-
potheses, this increase is welfare-improving). One of the legislative models in Besley and Coate
(2003) gives rise to uncertainty in provision of the local public good across jurisdictions because
of the vagaries of the minimum winning coalition. If public goods provision is less predictable, it
could appear as greater interjurisdictional variation in the equations below because they look at the
variance in a residual. This would imply a negative relationship between pollution variation and
decentralization (i.e., the opposite of the predictions thus far).
Lockwood (2002) also ﬁnds inefﬁcient provision of local public goods under a variety of
decision-rules governing the decisions of the central legislature. Although he does not report re-
sultsaboutthelevelofthepublicgood, hedoesconcludecentralizationcanyielduniformprovision
of a public good when regional spillovers are strong enough. For the current paper, this result im-
plies a positive relationship between decentralization and interjurisdictional variation; in addition,
it could suggest that this relationship would only characterize regional pollutants.
Finally, a few authors have advanced hypotheses about the interest group inﬂuence and capture
at different levels of government. Bardan and Mookherjee (2000) present reasons that local gov-
ernments may be more subject to capture, depending on factors such as within district and across
district heterogeneity in voters and relative voter awareness of local and national politics. In the
environmental policy literature, some argue that industry groups can better afford to have informed
staff in many places and thus are more inﬂuential at the subnational level (Esty, 1996; Morriss,
2000). Others have argued that interest groups must overcome a spending threshold to be heard
at a national level. Such a threshold would imply that centralization works in favor of industry,
whereas environmental organizations have a comparative advantage in the more grass-roots arena
of subnational politics (Revesz, 2001). Thus, the prior literature suggests that differential capture
may occur, but its direction is an empirical question, which we can take up here.
The literature discussed in this section is normative and does not usually examine the determi-
nants of decentralization.6 One question is how well these predictions will describe the effects of
6A few papers endogenize the process. Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) turn Oates’s argument into a positive
theory of the level of decentralization and present empirical evidence that more heterogeneous preferences encourage
5equilibrium (or at least endogenously-determined) decentralization. Because even optimal decen-
tralization would involve trade-offs across various dimensions, it seems likely the positive effects
predicted by the normative literature will arise even in the context of endogenous decentralization.
For example, a country that decentralizes to allow tailoring of programs to local preferences will
do so at the cost of increased free riding and thus may stop short of full decentralization. The
prediction that decentralization would be associated with greater pollution because of free riding
would still hold (as would the prediction that decentralization would be associated with greater in-
terjurisdictional variation). In addition, much of the empirical analysis here focuses on federalism,
an aspect of a country’s political organization that was determined in most countries by the time
the environment became an area of government activity. Thus, the remainder of this paper brings
these hypotheses from the normative literature to the data.
2 Data
2.1 Data on water quality
The UN’s GEMS/Water provides data on various water quality measures in rivers, lakes, and
groundwater (United Nations, 2009). This study focuses speciﬁcally on the data for rivers, which
account for most of the observations. GEMS reports triennial average pollution levels from 1979
through 1999. Figure 1 shows the location of the river monitoring stations (in 47 countries) that
report the pollutants studied here.7 Most stations do not report pollution in every triennial period:
the mean number of observations per station is 4.1 out of a possible 7.
Two pollutants are used in the analysis, biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and fecal col-
iform. These pollutants are very common; both arise mostly from release of human and agricul-
decentralization of policies for regulation of alcohol. Cutter and DeShazo (2007) examine an environmental policy
that allows local governments to request control from the state government. They conclude that heterogeneity across
the localities plays a large role in the apparent effects of devolution on stringency under this program.
7Stations located on rivers when they form an international border have been excluded because it is difﬁcult to as-
sign country characteristics (including decentralization) to these stations. For each pollutant, this restriction eliminated






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: GEMS river monitoring stations used in the analysis with country type
7tural wastes into rivers. They are also commonly reported in the GEMS data, providing a relatively
large number of observations for analysis. The two pollutants differ greatly in their potential for
downstream transport. BOD has much slower natural attenuation and may affect the rivers tens of
kilometers downstream of its source, whereas fecal coliform affects at most several kilometers of
the river. Thus, BOD is likely to give rise to substantial interjurisdictional spillovers, whereas fecal
coliform will only have interjurisdictional spillovers very near borders.
Table 1 reports the statistics for the two pollutants. The average concentrations for both pollu-
tantsareveryhigh.8 Theaverageconcentrationsare5.4mg/lofBODandover10,000colonies/100
ml of fecal coliform. For comparison, rivers with BOD higher than 4 mg/l or fecal coliform higher
than 2,000 colonies/100 ml would not be acceptable for any recreational use (including boating)
according to the Resources for the Future (RFF) Water Quality Ladder (Vaughan, 1986). Me-
dians are not as bad: 2.2 mg/l for BOD (acceptable for swimming according to RFF) and 920
colonies/100 ml for fecal coliform (acceptable for ﬁshing).
GEMS reports a mean pollution level for measurements taken at different times during the
three-year period, with little information about the timing of these measurements. The third row
in Table 1 reports that the observations are based on an average of 30 measurements in nonfederal
countryand24infederalcountries, orabout8to10ayear.9 However, thenumberofmeasurements
has a high standard deviation, so the precision of the observations varies considerably. The number
of measurements are used as weights in the estimated equations to address the heteroskedasticity
from this variation.
8Fecal coliform, in particular, has some exceedingly high values, with concentrations in the millions of colonies per
100 ml, concentrations that would characterize raw sewage and probably represent data entry errors. Concentrations
above the 95th percentile (200,000 colonies/100 ml) have been discarded for the rest of the analyses; including these
observations only affects the results in one equation below and is discussed there.
9Stations may report one pollutant but not the other in a given year, so the samples are somewhat different for the
two pollutants. For simplicity, the two samples are pooled in Table 1 because the differences in sample statistics were
very small.
8Table 1: Means and standard deviations of the data
Nonfederal Federal
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Mean BOD concentration (mg/l) 3.76 9.95 6.99 22.01
Mean fecal coliform (thousand colonies/100 ml) 10.9 26.6 9.8 27.6
Number of measurements per observation 30.7 26.3 25.2 14.8
Country-level variables
Expenditure decentralization (percent) 18.0 9.8 38.5 10.9
Expenditure decentralization missing .40 – .08 –
Expedenditure decentralization without defense (percent) 19.9 11.5 46.8 14.8
Expedenditure decentralization without defense missing .51 – .26 –
GDP per capita (thousand 1996 dollars) 12.8 7.9 8.44 8.39
Political rights (1 (best) – 7 (worst)) 2.5 2.0 2.4 1.2
Corruption index (0 (worst) – 6 (best)) 4.1 1.6 3.5 1.2
Country population (millions) 105 216 411 364
Country area (thousand km2) 853 1845 4906 4776
Station-level variables
Population within 20 km (thousands) 756 1296 553 756
Flow (m3/sec) 1562 5844 2204 5110
Temperature 16.1 6.3 21.5 7.1







Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables only.
Variables have been pooled across pollutants.
92.2 Explanatory variables
Decentralization measures. An ideal measure of decentralization in environmental policy is
difﬁcult to construct for both practical and conceptual reasons. First, countries use very different
regulatory structures, so a single metric of the extent of environmental decentralization is not avail-
able. Second, statutory rules may be a poor guide for true power. For example, in the U.S., most
environmental standards are established by the federal government, but implementation and en-
forcement is devolved to the states (Sigman, 2003). States exercise substantial discretion in setting
allowable water pollution permits, despite what would appear to be clear federal standards (GAO,
1996). Third, environmental regulation may be only one of the government functions that affects
pollution. Decisions about land use and spending on sewage treatment will also be important, but
may not be in the portfolio of an environmental agency or ministry.
For these reasons, this paper uses two general deﬁnitions of decentralization, both common
in previous literature. One measure is a categorization of countries into federal and nonfederal
systems from the establish political science literature on federalism (see, e.g., Treisman, 2002).
This measure has the advantage of being exhaustive in coverage and of characterizing a broad
range of government functions, including policies such as command-and-control regulation that
may have limited ﬁscal impact. Figure 1 shows the countries that are federal and nonfederal in this
taxonomy.
A second measure is expenditure decentralization: the ratio of subnational (state, provincial,
and local) government spending to total governmental spending, netting out intergovernmental
transfers. Expenditure decentralization has the advantage of varying over time, allowing more
robust treatment of unobserved heterogeneity among countries. However, expenditure decentral-
ization is not consistently available, with much sparser coverage in lower income and non-federal
countries.
The World Bank (2001) provides an expenditure decentralization measure, based on data from
the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS).10 I also recalculated ex-
10I found some very small disparities between the World Bank values and those I calculated directly from the GFS
10penditure decentralization from GFS, excluding defense spending as a potentially large and ex-
clusively national category of spending. The additional information requirements for this measure
decreasethenumberofavailableobservations. Theoverallcorrelationbetweenthetwomeasuresis
very high, so this modiﬁed measure is used only for equations focusing on time-series variation.11
Expenditure decentralization measures may reﬂect high frequency budgetary shocks that are irrel-
evant to the relative power of national and subnational authorities. The data set partially addresses
this concern by using three-year averages, which also match the GEMS reporting periods.
Table 1 divides the observations according to the qualitative federalism measure. GEMS sta-
tions are found in both federal and nonfederal countries, with the later only somewhat more com-
mon. Federalism and expenditure decentralization are closely related; subnational expenditure
shares average 38% in federal countries, compared to 18% in other countries.12 Data on expen-
diture decentralization is also much more common in federal countries, with only a few missing
observations for federal countries and 39% missing in the other countries. Average pollution levels
are higher for both pollutants in the federal countries.
Other explanatory variables. Several other characteristics of countries are included. First, na-
tional per capita income may affect the costs of pollution control and the beneﬁts of water quality.
The Penn World Table provides annual income levels standardized for cross-country comparisons
(Heston et al., 2006). As Table 1 reports, countries that participate in GEMS/Water have high in-
come on average; European countries in particular are overrepresented. The relatively high-income
population may be desirable because countries must have binding environmental restrictions for
any effect of decentralization to be detected.
Second, earlier research has suggested that more responsive governments choose lower pollu-
and had a greater number of missing observations in my calculations. The difference probably stems from different
versions of the GFS. Because the World Bank has greater coverage, the equations primarily use the World Bank values,
with my calculations ﬁlled in for a few observations that were otherwise missing.
11Since 1990, environmental protection is a category of GFS expenditures, which holds out the prospect of a more
speciﬁc expenditure decentralization measure. However, this information is only ﬁlled in from 1998 onward, too late
to be useful here, and even then for very few countries.
12Treisman (2002) reports that expenditure decentralization measure is also highly correlated with other qualitative
measures of decentralization from countries’ constitutions and moderately correlated with the frequency of elected
subnational governments.
11tion than autocratic regimes (Congleton, 1992; Barrett and Graddy, 2000). Because more repres-
sive governments may also tend to be more centralized, it is important to consider this factor in
the estimated equations. Freedom House (2006) annually evaluates countries’ “political rights” on
a scale from 1 (most extensive rights) to 7 (fewest rights). Political rights are fairly good in the
GEMS sample, with an average index of 2.5 in both federal and nonfederal countries.
Third, studies have found that corruption plays an important role in environmental outcomes
(Welsh, 2004; Damania et al., 2003) and that decentralization or federalism is a source of cor-
ruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Treisman, 2000). International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
provides annual corruption scores for countries, based on surveys of professionals (PRS Group,
2007).13 Consistent with earlier literature, Table 1 reports that federal countries are somewhat
more corrupt, with an average ICRG score of 3.5 compared to 4.1 for nonfederal countries.
Population may also affect water quality, principally by determining uncontrolled pollution
levels. I used a Geographic Information System (GIS) to construct local population, speciﬁcally
population within 20 kilometers of the station. The GEMS stations are superimposed (based on
their latitude and longitude) on the Gridded Population of the World 3 (CIESN, 2005). Population
gridsare availablefor1990, 1995, and2000. Forother years, localpopulation variablesarelinearly
interpolated or extrapolated. To provide better time-series population information, the equations
also include annual country population density.
Three river characteristics are also included in the equations. The river ﬂow determines dilu-
tion rates and thus the effect of a given amount of waste on in-stream pollution concentrations.
Rivers also vary in the rate of natural attenuation of pollutants; water temperature is an important
determinant of this rate. GEMS provides time-varying measures of both ﬂow and temperature. A
ﬁnal non-time-varying river characteristic is the river basin area upstream of the station; although
this variable is closely related to ﬂow, it may help capture the total waste inputs affecting the river
at the monitoring station.
13ICRG does not provide data for three countries in the GEMS data (Fiji, Laos, and Cambodia), which are therefore
dropped. Corruption scores are available from 1984 onward; the value for the country in 1984 was used for earlier
years.
123 Results for pollution levels
The ﬁrst set of estimated equations examine the effect of decentralization on pollution levels and
have the form:
logpict = f(Dct;GDPct;GOVct;DENSct;LOCALPOPict;Rict;UPCHARict)+at +mic+eict; (1)
where pict is the mean pollution concentration at ith station in country c in year t; Dct is the
measure of decentralization; GDPct is annual per capita GDP; GOVct is the quality of government
(political rights and corruption); DENSct is country population density; LOCALPOPict is local
population; and Rict are river characteristics (ﬂow, temperature, and upstream basin area). The
equations for the regional pollutant, BOD, also include UPCHARict; which are dummy variables
for whether the station is within 100 km of an international border (up or downstream) and, if it is
downstream, the country characteristics for the upstream country. These variables are intended to
reﬂect the upstream country’s contributions to pollution that has ﬂowed downstream to this spot.
Year dummies, at; are included to capture changes over time in pollution control technologies and
environmental preferences. Some equations also include station ﬁxed effects, mic.
A log-log functional form was chosen for equation (1) because factors that affect the uncon-
trolled pollution levels, such as population and river ﬂow, should have effects that are multiplica-
tive. In an exception to the log-log speciﬁcation, GDP variables enter the equations with a cubic
in levels to allow the nonlinearities found by the “environmental Kuznets curve” literature (e.g.,
Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
Table 2 presents the results without ﬁxed effects, taking advantage of both cross-section and
time-series variation. In this table, errors are clustered by country to address the potential correla-
tion in errors within a country at a given time and over time at the same station.
In Table 3, the equations include monitoring station ﬁxed effects. This approach allows identi-
ﬁcation only from time series variation and restricts the analysis to the expenditure decentralization
measure. Once cross-sectional identiﬁcation is abandoned, no information is lost by allowing ﬁxed
13Table 2: Weighted least squares estimates for pollution levels
Dependent variable:
Log(BOD) Log(Colif.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Federal country .353 – -.292 –
(.256) (.561)
Log(Decentralization) – .022 – -.402
(.218) (.332)
Other country characteristics:
GDP per capita .026 .172 .185 .944
(.059) (.306) (.261) (.420)
GDP per capita squared .004 -.009 -.016 -.060
(.006) (.020) (.021) (.026)
GDP per capita cubed /100 -.019 .010 .032 .111
(.016) (.038) (.047) (.046)
Log(Lack of political rights) .172 .036 -.018 -.036
(.217) (.268) (.404) (.385)
Log(Lack of corruption) -.376 -.363 -.554 -1.28
(.207) (.511) (.469) (.929)
Log(Population density) .112 .173 .427 .816
(.106) (.170) (.230) (.282)
Local characteristics:
Log(Local population) .091 .128 .181 .156
(.046) (.058) (.125) (.147)
Log(River ﬂow) -.091 -.088 -.049 .009
(.021) (.022) (.128) (.117)
Log(Water temperature) .247 .131 2.044 1.611
(.205) (.467) (.699) (.769)
Log(Upstream basin area) .076 .091 -.004 -.017
(.021) (.025) (.123) (.120)
R2 .28 .20 .30 .33
Number of observations 635 442 535 395
Number of countries 37 28 38 28
Notes: Weighted by number of measurements.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
Equations also include year dummies, ﬁve world region dummies, and
(for BOD only) upstream country characteristics.
14effects at the most detailed geographical level, the monitoring station.
Decentralization. The coefﬁcients on the decentralization variables depend greatly on the pol-
lutant and on whether ﬁxed effects are included. In the ﬁrst column of Table 2, the qualitative
federalism measure has a positive point estimate, suggesting higher BOD levels, but this coef-
ﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. The expenditure decentralization variable has a very small
and statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. In columns (3) and (4) for fecal coliform, both pooled
equations have negative point estimates, but neither estimate is statistically signiﬁcant.
When station ﬁxed effects are added in Table 3, the results provide more support for an effect of
expenditure decentralization. For BOD, the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant and positive, with
an elasticity of BOD levels to expenditure decentralization of .275. A slightly larger point estimate
emerges when the decentralization measure excludes national defense spending in column (2).
In the fecal coliform equations, the coefﬁcients are again not statistically signiﬁcant for either
measure of decentralization.14
The sensitivity of the estimated coefﬁcients to inclusion of ﬁxed effects may reﬂect the large
amount of heterogeneity across countries that affects their pollution levels. Isolating only the
change in decentralization within a country over the two decades facilitates ﬁnding an effect. It is
also interesting that the more precise measure, expenditure decentralization without national de-
fense, yields a higher point estimate for BOD than the broader measure, which would be consistent
with measurement error in the broader measure.15
The estimates in Table 3 provide evidence of a positive effect of decentralization on BOD, but
no evidence of an effect on fecal coliform. If the effect is only present for BOD, free riding would
be a plausible explanation because it would lead to higher levels of the regional pollutant, but not
the local one.
14Column (4) in Table 3 is the only equation where the policy result is sensitive to the exclusion of the very high
observations for coliform. If the full sample is included, this equation yields a very large positive coefﬁcient on
decentralization (about 2.7) that is statistically signiﬁcant.
15Running the equations from columns (1) on the restricted set of observations in columns (2) slightly reduced the
decentralization coefﬁcient.
15Table 3: Station ﬁxed effects estimates for pollution levels
Dependent variable:
Log(BOD) Log(Colif)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Overall decentralization) .275 – -.355 –
(.123) (.575)
Log(Decentralization – no defense) – .320 – .851
(.147) (.734)
Other country characteristics:
GDP per capita -.126 .007 .047 .706
(.133) (.159) (.582) (.734)
GDP per capita squared .009 -.002 .013 -.023
(.009) (.010) (.032) (.039)
GDP per capita cubed /100 -.021 .005 -.036 .023
(.018) (.021) (.058) (.068)
Log(Lack of political rights) .107 .195 -.415 -.215
(.112) (.181) (.519) (.685)
Log(Lack of corruption) .556 .614 -2.25 -2.06
(.143) (.169) (1.23) (1.44)
Log(Population density) -.517 -1.61 4.187 3.450
(.965) (1.37) (4.03) (4.88)
Station characteristics:
Log(Local population) .884 1.692 -1.86 -1.91
(.420) (.542) (1.22) (1.32)
Log(Flow) -.023 -.021 .033 .052
(.017) (.019) (.084) (.088)
Log(Temperature) .251 .202 -.332 -.717
(.206) (.302) (.759) (.843)
R2 (includes station effects) .91 .91 .84 .84
Number of observations 725 552 596 517
Number of stations 201 175 162 144
Notes: Weighted by number of measurements per observation.
Equations also include year dummies and, for BOD, upstream country characteristics.
16Other covariates. Other covariates also differ between the pooled and ﬁxed effects equations
and between the two pollutants. The GDP coefﬁcients are not jointly statistically signiﬁcant in any
of the equations, with or without ﬁxed effects. For the pooled equations, the world region dummies
seem sufﬁcient to absorb the variation GDP otherwise picks up. Contrary to earlier literature, the
equations do not support an important role for political rights. The coefﬁcient on this variable is
not statistically signiﬁcant in any equation. In most of the equations, it does have a positive point
estimate, which would be consistent with the view that more repressive countries allow greater
pollution.
Corruption has some conﬂicting point estimates. Consistent with earlier studies, less corrupt
countries do appear to have lower pollution in the pooled equations in Table 2; however, the the
coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% only in column (1). In the ﬁxed effects equations for
BOD in Table 3, corruption has a counterintuitive positive coefﬁcient that is statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Rapidly improving conditions in the Eastern European countries are the largest change in
corruption over time; the coefﬁcient may reﬂect worsening (reported) pollution in this region.
The local population variable mostly has the expected positive coefﬁcients. In the pooled
equations, thiscoefﬁcientisstatisticallysigniﬁcantforbothpollutants, buttheestimatedelasticities
ofpollutiontolocalpopulationaresubstantiallylessthanone. ForBOD,theﬁxedeffectsequations
do yield elasticities that are near one and statistically signiﬁcant, despite fairly limited information
on the time series of local population. For coliform, however, the ﬁxed effects coefﬁcients are
negative and not statistically signiﬁcant. Even the 20 kilometer ring may be too broad a deﬁnition
of the local area for this pollutant.
Some of the river characteristics also show the expected effects. Higher river ﬂow reduces
pollution levels in the pooled equations for BOD, consistent with the hypothesis that it tends to
dilute pollution, but is not statistically signiﬁcant elsewhere. Higher temperature is associated with
statistically signiﬁcantly higher pollution only in the pooled equations in Table 2. Upstream basin
area, available only without ﬁxed effects, enters with statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients
for BOD, but not for fecal coliform. This difference again may reﬂect the regional nature of BOD
17and local nature of fecal coliform.
4 Results for interjurisdictional variation in pollution
GEMS provides an unusual opportunity to explore interjurisdictional variation in pollution levels
becauseithasmultiplemonitoringstationswithinacountry. Eachstationwasmappedtothelargest
sub-national administrative region, using its latitude and longitude and the Global Administrative
Unit Layers (GAUL) from the FAO.
A two-step approach was used to calculate variation across regions. In the ﬁrst step, log pollu-
tion levels are regressed on station-level characteristics and a ﬁxed effect, gct; for the country and
year of the observation:
logpict = g(LOCALPOPic;Rict;UPCHARict)+gct +eict: (2)
To allow the most ﬂexible association, the local population and river characteristics (ﬂow and
temperature) are entered with a cubic. The errors eict were then averaged for each subnational
region. The interjurisdictional variation was calculated as the standard deviation for these regional
values for country c in year t, sdct(e).





The equation includes decentralization, Dct, and other country characteristics, CountryCharct.
Time and country effects (now asd
t and nsd
c ) can still be included. Because the left-hand-side
of the equations is implicitly in logs, the right-hand-side variables are also in logs.
In Table 4, the equations examine both qualitative federalism and expenditure decentralization.
Lacking any speciﬁc theory of the causes of variation, equations start with a minimal set of co-
variates. In addition to federalism or expenditure decentralization, country population, POPct and
18country area, AREAc, are included. Both variables are associated with greater decentralization (see
Table 1), probably because larger countries are more difﬁcult to run centrally. At the same time,
these variables may affect interjurisdictional variation. In particular, countries with larger areas
may have greater diversity in types of ecosystems and thus pollution levels. Columns (2) and (5)
in the table add the full set of country characteristics used above.
The mean number of jurisdiction represented in a country-period cell is only 5.9 for BOD and
5.2 for fecal coliform. As a result, the standard deviation estimates contain a large amount of
noise. Although robust standard errors address the heteroskedasticity from this noise, hypothesis
tests may lack power because of the limited available information. Thus, a deﬁnitive study of
interjurisdictional variation may await a more extensive global data collection effort.
Decentralization measures. The equations in Table 4 suggest a relationship between decentral-
ization and interjurisdictional variation, but only through the qualitative federalism measure. The
point estimate of this coefﬁcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both pollutants. How-
ever, the expenditure decentralization measure produces coefﬁcients that are very close to zero and
statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for both pollutants.
A positive effect of federalism on interjurisdictional variation is consistent with the traditional
view of decentralization: when localities have more power, they choose environmental quality lev-
els to correspond to local tastes and costs, resulting in greater heterogeneity than under central
authority. However, other hypotheses might also give rise to this pattern. Lockwood (2002) re-
ports that one possible outcome of his model of the central government’s legislative bargaining is
uniformity in provision of the public good when regional spillovers are large enough.
Several explanations might be offered for the ﬁnding that the qualitative federalism variable has
a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient whereas expenditure decentralization does not. One possibility
is that this reﬂects data limitations. The loss of observations due to lack of expenditure decentral-
ization data may pose an obstacle to estimating this coefﬁcient.16 However, it is also possible that
16Running the equation with the federal variable on the sample with non-missing expenditure decentralization yields
coefﬁcients on federalism of similar magnitude to columns (1) and (4); the federalism coefﬁcient is statistically sig-
19Table 4: Determinants of interjurisdictional variation
Dependent variable:
sdct(eBOD) sdct(eColif)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Federal country .282 .307 – .747 .799 –
(.107) (.108) (.209) (.235)
Log(Decentralization) – – .001 – – -.063
(.097) (.291)
Log(Country population) .083 .122 .151 .321 .308 .509
(.039) (.060) (.079) (.130) (.122) (.162)
Log(Country area) -.057 -.079 -.064 -.206 -.203 -.192
(.035) (.053) (.068) (.121) (.105) (.235)
GDP per capita – .052 – – -.015 –
(.073) (.176)
GDP per capita squared – -.005 – – -.005 –
(.005) (.012)
GDP per capita cubed /100 – .009 – – .016 –
(.009) (.025)
Log(Lack of political rights) – -.121 – – -.262 –
(.174) (.295)
Log(Lack of corruption) – -.182 – – -.070 –
(.115) (.282)
R2 .31 .37 .29 .32 .36 .32
Number of observations 140 136 104 121 121 93
Number of countries 36 36 31 35 35 28
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
Equations also include year dummies and region dummies.
20the federalism variable more accurately measures the powers necessary for localities to differen-
tiate their provision of the good. Expenditure decentralization may not extend local government
power into the relevant regulatory sphere. Equations with country ﬁxed effects also did not yield
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on expenditure decentralization (and are not reported).
Other covariates. In the equations in Table 4, few country characteristics beyond federalism
account for interjurisdictional variation. Country population has the expected positive coefﬁcient,
which is consistently statistically signiﬁcant. Country area has an unexpected negative coefﬁcient,
but it is not statistically signiﬁcant in any equation. Neither GDP nor the quality of government
has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on variation for either pollutant.17
5 Conclusion
A substantial literature addresses the question of optimal decentralization in local public goods
provision. This paper attempts to test empirically some of the most basic hypotheses from this
literature. It looks speciﬁcally at two public bads, a pollutant with interjurisdictional spillovers and
a pollutant with more local effects.
The evidence in this paper points to higher levels of the regional pollutant with more decen-
tralization. The effects only appear in equations with ﬁxed effects; cross-sectional analysis does
not provide much support for any effect of decentralization. Greater levels of decentralization may
provide more opportunities for free riding in regional pollutants, so these results are consistent with
earlier empirical research suggesting free riding within the U.S. The results provide limited sup-
port for more general problems from decentralization, such as destructive regulatory competition
or greater sensitivity of local governments to interest group politics.
In addition, the results suggest higher interjurisdictional variation in pollution in countries with
niﬁcant for coliform, but not BOD.
17The regional dummies (which are not shown) suggest African countries have much smaller BOD variation than
other countries, which may be a coincidence facilitated by small numbers of African observations; no such difference
appears for fecal coliform. The year dummies (also not reported) suggest a slight trend toward reduced variation in
BOD, but not fecal coliform.
21federal systems. Such variation supports the traditional view of Oates (1972) that decentralization
allows better tailoring of policies to local conditions. The results may thus support a welfare gain
from decentralization, which needs to be weighed against the suggestion above of free riding.
Thus, decentralization in practice seems to have both positive and negative consequences for the
efﬁciency of environmental policies.
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